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Abstract
This paper presents a graphical user interface (GUI) for the Maude-NPA, a crypto protocol analysis
tool that takes into account algebraic properties of cryptosystems not supported by other tools,
such as cancellation of encryption and decryption, Abelian groups (including exclusive or), and
modular exponentiation. Maude-NPA has a theoretical basis in rewriting logic, uniﬁcation and
narrowing, and performs backwards search from a ﬁnal attack state to determine whether or not
it is reachable from an initial state. The GUI animates the Maude-NPA veriﬁcation process,
displaying the complete search tree and allowing users to display graphical representations of ﬁnal
and intermediate nodes of the search tree. One of the most interesting points of this work is that
our GUI has been developed using the framework for declarative graphical interaction associated
to Maude that includes IOP, IMaude and JLambda. This framework facilitates the interaction and
the interoperation between formal reasoning tools (Maude-NPA in our case) and allows Maude to
communicate easily with other tools.
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1 Introduction
The Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer is a tool for analyzing cryptographic pro-
tocols that takes into account the equational properties of the cryptosystems
involved. These include, for example, exclusive or and Diﬃe-Hellman expo-
nentiation. But a key property of Maude-NPA that it is designed to, is be
extensible, that is, the procedures and techniques used by the tool are gen-
eral enough so that they can be readily extended to include new equational
theories as they arise.
A good graphical user interface can do much to help the extensibility and
usability of Maude-NPA. For the general user, it can provide graphical rep-
resentations of both successful and failed attack paths, helping the user to
understand the reasons behind the success or failure of a protocol. For an
advanced user, who may be trying out new equational theories, it can provide
a closer look at the search tree, indicating where a state explosion is occurring
that may indicate a problem that must be redressed by better mechanisms for
the new theory. For the tool developers, a close look at problematic nodes on
both full and partial search trees may gain insight into why the state explosion
is occurring and what mechanisms need to be devised or improved to address
the problem. But, in order to provide all these services, the GUI must ani-
mate, not only successful attacks, but the entire Maude-NPA search process.
Thus, the services it provides must go much beyond those oﬀered by a usual
GUI.
The desirable features mentioned above for the Maude-NPA GUI are not
obtained by following a standard approach to GUI development. Indeed, we
seriously doubt that a standard approach using a conventional programming
language could have given us the simplicity, levels of abstraction, and ﬂexibility
for the GUI features and ease of evolution that we need in a tool like the
Maude-NPA whose design is still evolving. Instead, our approach to GUI
design is based on a philosophical viewpoint that regards GUI interactions as
another form of rewriting ; speciﬁcally, it is based on a declarative, rewriting-
based approach to GUI design.
We can summarize this declarative approach as follows. First of all, the
rewriting logic approach to concurrent object interaction [20,21], in which
object transitions are speciﬁed by rewrite rules, is adopted as the semantic
framework for both the Maude-NPA, where cryptographic protocols are in-
deed speciﬁed this way, and for the Maude-NPA’s GUI. That is, the tool’s
GUI and its interactions with the user are also speciﬁed by rewrite rules in
which proxy GUI objects interact with the user and with an encapsulation
of Maude-NPA by message passing. Second, a GUI implementation is then
derived from its rewriting logic speciﬁcation by mapping these proxy objects
S. Santiago et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 258 (2009) 3–204
to corresponding graphical objects that appear like built-in external objects
supported by the Maude infrastructure [8]. The implementation of the graph-
ical objects and message passing communication with these external objects is
achieved using the InterOperability Platform (IOP), that supports the actor
model, and its associated IMaude library [18] (see Section 3). The infrastruc-
ture used to build the Maude-NPA GUI is quite general, extending Maude
to provide a framework on top of which many interesting applications and
graphical interfaces can be built.
1.1 Related work
The area of formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has been an active
one since the mid 1980’s. The idea is to verify protocols that use encryption
to guarantee secrecy and that use authentication of data to ensure security,
against an attacker (commonly called the Dolev-Yao attacker) who has com-
plete control of the network, and can intercept, alter, and redirect traﬃc,
create new traﬃc on his/her own, perform all operations available to legiti-
mate participants, and may have access to some subset of the longterm keys
of legitimate principals. In the simplest case, cryptosystems are assumed to
behave like black boxes: an attacker knows nothing about encrypted data
unless it has the appropriate key. In more sophisticated analyses, the cryp-
tosystem may be assumed to obey a set of equational properties, as in our
own tool, Maude-NPA, or may even be fully speciﬁed in the type of computa-
tional model used by cryptographers. Whatever approach is taken, the use of
formal methods has had a long history, not only for providing formal proofs
of security, but also for uncovering bugs and security ﬂaws that in some cases
had remained unknown long after the original protocol’s publication.
A number of approaches have been taken to the formal veriﬁcation of cryp-
tographic protocols. One of the most popular is model checking, in which the
interaction of the protocol with the attacker is symbolically executed. In-
deed, model-checking of secrecy (and later, authentication) in protocols in the
bounded-session model (where a session is a single execution of a process repre-
senting an honest principal) has been shown to be decidable [24], and a number
of bounded-session model checkers exist. Moreover, a number of unbounded
model checkers, of which Maude-NPA is one, either make use of abstraction
to enforce decidability, or allow for the possibility of non-termination.
The earliest tools, such as the Interrogator [16] and the NRL Protocol An-
alyzer (NPA) [19], while not strictly speaking model checkers, relied on state
exploration, and, in the case of NPA, could be used to verify security prop-
erties speciﬁed in a temporal logic language. Later, researchers used generic
model checkers to analyze protocols, such as FDR [17] and later Murphi [22].
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More recently the focus has been on special-purpose model checkers developed
speciﬁcally for cryptographic protocol analysis, such as Blanchet’s ProVerif [6],
the AVISPA tool [4], and Maude-NPA itself [13].
One of the advantages of using model-checkers is that they give explicit
counter-examples, which can provide insights into the reasons why a system
fails to satisfy its speciﬁcation. In the case of cryptographic protocol analysis
tools, such counterexamples are very amenable to graphical expression: each
process (including attacker processes) can be written as a sequence of nodes,
which represent either sending or receiving messages. If a process sends a
message to another, this can be written as an arrow from the sending node
to the receiving node. The popular strand space model [27], upon which a
number of tools, including Maude-NPA, is based, makes use of such notation
and formalizes it.
GUI interfaces for protocol analysis tools have thus traditionally focused on
model-checkers. They generally fall into two categories: interfaces that assist
the user in specifying protocols that are input into the tool, and interfaces
that assist the user in understanding the output.
Probably the earliest case of the latter was one of the ﬁrst protocol analysis
tools developed, the Interrogator [16]. The Interrogator performed a depth-
ﬁrst backwards search from an insecure state. Each time it could go no further
along a path, whether the result was successful or not, it would display the
result in a graphical form, thus giving an animation of the tool’s search process.
A graphical representation of a normal execution was also used to assist the
user to specify attack states to be searched for.
A more recent example of a graphical output interface is the Scyther tool
[9]. It searches from instances of roles, generating all trace patterns that are
consistent with it. The Scyther tool outputs graphical representations of these
trace patterns. Unlike the Interrogator, however, it does not output partial or
unsuccessful patterns.
Regarding GUIs that assist protocol speciﬁcations, one prominent example
is SPAN [7], a companion tool for AVISPA. SPAN is a graphical protocol
animator that allows a user to check the validity of speciﬁcations written in
the AVISPA input language, HLPSL. SPAN allows the user to step through
executions of a protocol in the absence of an intruder, determining whether
or not it is behaving according to the intended way. SPAN can also be used
with the intruder present to construct attacks on protocols, although it does
not ﬁnd them automatically; the user must choose each step to execute out of
a set presented to him by the tool.
Another example of a GUI that assists protocol speciﬁcations, with a very
diﬀerent approach, is the Protocol Derivation Assistant (PDA) [3]. PDA al-
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lows the user to specify not only single protocols, but families of protocols,
using graphical techniques for constructing new protocols out of old ones. PDA
also supports integration with diﬀerent speciﬁcation and analysis frameworks,
so it can be used as an interface with diﬀerent formal tools.
All of the above GUIs, except to a certain extend the Interrogator, have
one thing in common. They assist the user either in specifying input into
a protocol analysis tool or interpreting the output of the tool. But they do
not provide much insight into the workings of the analysis tool itself. But
this can be very helpful, especially in a tool like Maude-NPA that takes an
extensible approach to incorporating new equational theories. Being able to
examine the results of partial and failed searches can help a user understand
why a particular protocol or a new equational theory is producing a state
explosion or inﬁnite loops, and what needs to be done to address the problems.
It can also provide assistance in the debugging of protocol speciﬁcations, in
a way similar to the SPAN tool. Finally, an understanding of partial and
failed searches can be useful in identifying the key assumptions upon which a
protocol’s security depends, a piece of information which is otherwise diﬃcult
to get from model-checkers. For these reasons we have decided to develop an
interface for Maude-NPA that goes beyond what GUIs for protocol analysis
tools usually provide, and gives the user a complete animation of the Maude-
NPA search tree generation process which she can search at will.
1.2 Structure of the paper
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
Maude-NPA tool and its use. Section 3 presents some background about
the IOP, IMaude and JLambda frameworks. In Section 4, we give some
details on how the Maude-NPA GUI has been actually implemented using
the IOP-IMaude framework. Section 5 describes in detail the features of the
Maude-NPA GUI, including some pictures. In Section 6, we ﬁnish with some
conclusions and plans for future work.
2 Maude-NPA
Maude-NPA is a tool for ﬁnding attacks, or proving their absence, in a cryp-
tographic protocol. It uses backwards search from insecure states. It analyzes
inﬁnite state systems including an active intruder, making no abstraction or
approximation of nonces, and with an unbounded number of sessions. In order
to reduce the search space it uses various optimization techniques, to prevent
inﬁnite loops and to avoid useless transitions to unreachable states. The tool
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is publicly available 7 , including a user manual and some protocol examples.
One major feature of the tool is that it supports algebraic identities obeyed
by the crypto-algorithm, such as exclusive or, exponentation and encryp-
tion/decryption cancellation. The ultimate goal, however, is for the equational
theories oﬀered by Maude-NPA to be user extensible so that new equational
theories falling into a broad class can be introduced.
The protocol model used by Maude-NPA is based on the popular strand
space model introduced by Thayer, Herzog and Guttman in [27]. Each local
execution or session of an honest principal is represented by a sequence of pos-
itive and negative terms called a strand. These terms are built from variables,
function symbols and constants. Negative terms represent received messages,
and positive terms stand for sent messages. An example of a strand is given
below:
[ pke(B,NA;A)
+, pke(A,NA;NB)
−, pke(B,NB)+ ]
This strand tells us that a principal A ﬁrst sends a message with a nonce (NA)
concatenated with her name (A) encrypted under B’s public key. Then, she
receives a message encrypted with her public key that contains her previously
sent nonce concatenated with a nonce (NB) (presumably from B). Finally,
she sends the nonce NB encrypted under B’s public key.
Each intruder action is also represented by a strand. The following intruder
strand
[ X−, Y −, (X;Y )+ ]
shows that the intruder has the ability to concatenate two messages, once he
or she has learned them.
A strand may contain variables, except for terms of type Fresh, which
are always treated as constant (i.e., they are used in nonces). Strands are
annotated with the variables of type Fresh generated by that principal. The
following example is an honest principal strand speciﬁed in Maude-NPA and
annotated with the fresh variable “r ” used for nonce n(A, r):
:: r :: [ pke(B, n(A, r);A)+, pke(A, n(A, r);NB)
−, pke(B,NB)+ ]
As one of the techniques to avoid inﬁnite loops, Maude-NPA relies on
the assumption that an attacker never learns a term more than once, so the
tool must keep track of what terms are learned and when during a backwards
search. Backwards search means that we know what the intruder knows in the
future, but we have an incomplete picture of what the intruder learned in the
past. We need to determine the concrete moment when the intruder learns
something. Such augmentations of the strand space model to include state
7 At http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/tools/Maude-NPA/
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are not new (see for example [23], which includes an explicit representation
of the knowledge of each principal), but the Maude-NPA requirements are
somewhat unusual in that the use of backwards search necessitates an explicit
representation of what will happen in the future. Thus the original strand
space model is augmented to include the notion of time in terms of “past”,
“future”, and “present”. The strands used in Maude-NPA include a marker
which denotes the current state of the execution. This marker separates the
past and the future messages of a strand and allows Maude-NPA to perform
a backwards search through the strands from a ﬁnal state towards an initial
state. The notion of present tells what the intruder knows in the present,
which is denoted by expresions of the form t ∈ I. The notion of future means
what the intruder does not know in the present but will deﬁnitely learn in the
future, which is denoted by expresions of the form t /∈ I.
In our tool a state is represented by a set of strands plus the intruder
knowledge and looks like this:
[ m±11, . . . | . . . , m±k11 ] & . . . & [ m±1n, . . . | . . . , m±knn ]
&{t1 ∈ I, . . . , tm ∈ I, s1 ∈ I, . . . , sm′ ∈ I}
where:
(i) Each strand is divided into past and future [ m±1 , . . . ,m
±
i | m±i+1, . . . ,m±k ],
where m±1 , . . ., m
±
i is the past, m
±
i+1 is the present, and m
±
i+2 . . . ,m
±
k is
the future.
(ii) An initial strand is one in which the past part is empty: [ nil | m±1 , . . . ,m±k ].
On the other hand, a ﬁnal strand is one in which the future part is empty:
[ m±1 , . . . ,m
±
k | nil ].
(iii) The intruder knowledge contains terms of the form m ∈ I and m ∈ I,
where m ∈ I means what the intruder knows m in the present and m ∈ I
denotes terms the intruder does not know in the present but will deﬁnitely
learn in the future.
(iv) The initial intruder knowledge is a set without m ∈ I terms, i.e., a set of
the form {t1 ∈ I, . . . , tn ∈ I}, whereas the ﬁnal intruder knowledge is a
set without m ∈ I terms, i.e., a set of the form {s1 ∈ I, . . . , sm ∈ I}.
From a given ﬁnal attack state, Maude-NPA executes the protocol back-
wards to an initial state, if possible. The ﬁrst step before actually starting
the backwards search is to prove lemmas about unreachable states by gener-
ating the grammars of the protocol. These grammars help to reduce the search
space (see [11]) and are automatically generated by the tool. For each inter-
mediate state found in the backwards execution, the tool checks whether it is
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unreachable using such lemmas (and other techniques, see [12]) and discards
it if so.
The analysis must start with a ﬁnal state describing the attack state and in-
cluding some ﬁnal strands and some intruder knowledge, typically with terms
of the form m ∈ I. Variables in the ﬁnal attack state are appropiately instan-
tiated by backwards narrowing. The number of strands and intruder facts is
increased by backwards narrowing.
Let us brieﬂy explain how the backwards narrowing analysis is performed.
Given a state, we ﬁx a concrete strand in the state and a message m±ij in the
past part of such strand. If m±ij is a negative node (m
−
ij), then it is (i) either
E-uniﬁed with a term sk already known by the intruder (i.e., a fact sk ∈ I
appears in the intruder knowledge of the given state), or (ii) included into the
intruder knowledge of the given state as a new challenge mij ∈ I, but only if
it is not already present in the intruder knowledge. Action (i) means that the
message m−ij received by a strand comes from the intruder, who knows that
message. Action (ii) means that the intruder must know message mij and we
include it into the set of challenges for the intruder. If m±ij is a positive node
(m+ij), it is (iii) either accepted but without increasing the intruder knowledge,
or (iv) E-uniﬁed with a term sk known by the intruder (i.e., a fact sk ∈ I
appears in the intruder knowledge of the given state), and the fact sk ∈ I is
transformed into sk ∈ I. Action (iii) means that the message mij output by
a strand is not relevant for the intruder. Action (iv) means that the message
mij output by a strand is used by the intruder to learn it, actually describing
when he learned it. In order to allow an unbounded number of strands, the
tool adds new strands containing messages of the form m+j such that mj E-
uniﬁes with a message sk known by the intruder (i.e., sk ∈ I appears in the
intruder knowledge) and also transforms the fact sk ∈ I into sk ∈ I. Further
details and protocol examples can be found in [13].
3 The InterOperability Platform (IOP) and IMaude
The InterOperability Platform (IOP) [18] was developed to facilitate the in-
teraction and interoperation between formal reasoning tools. In particular
IOP enables Maude to communicate with other tools, thus making it a good
starting point for developing a GUI for Maude-NPA. IMaude is a set of Maude
modules that provide basic features needed to program interactive assistants
in Maude. The combination of IOP and IMaude has been used in several
projects, including Remote Agents (providing an interactive graphical inter-
face to an executable speciﬁcation of a simple remote robot) [10] and the
Pathway Logic Assistant [26,25] (an interactive graphical interface for visual-
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izing and analyzing formal models of cellular signaling processes).
The next subsections explain in more detail the main components used to
develop the Maude-NPA GUI: the IOP Interaction Model, Interactive Maude
(IMaude), and the graphical interaction package g2d.
3.1 IOP Interaction Model
The IOP Interaction model is based on the actor model of distributed com-
putation [14,15,5,1,2]. The actor model is a model of distributed computation
based on the notion of independent computational agents, called actors, that
interact solely via message passing. An actor can create other actors; send
and receive messages; and modify its own local state. An actor can only aﬀect
the local state of other actors by sending them messages, and it can only send
messages to its acquaintances—either actors whose names it was given upon
creation, or names it received in a message or names of actors it created. Ac-
tor semantics admits only fair computations, which in the simplest case means
reliable message delivery.
In the IOP architecture there is a dynamic pool of actors, since new actors
can be created and existing actors can be destroyed. There are also three
independent processes that manage these actors: (i) Main, which creates and
conﬁgures the system; (ii) Registry, also called the system actor, that keeps
track of the current actors and maintains the lines of communications; and
(iii) IOP GUI.editor, which allows the user to communicate with any of the
actors 8 .
An IOP actor is one or more UNIX style processes registered within the
system. Each one has three FIFOs (i.e., UNIX style pipes). Its stdin, stdout
and stderr ﬁle descriptors are redirected to one of these FIFOs. An actor can
be created at the startup (these are the initials actors), in response to some
event, or by the user or another process asking the system actor to do so.
IOP comes with a basic set of actors. The most important for our purposes
are: (i) the System actor, (ii) the GUI.editor, (iii) the Maude actor, and (iv)
the Graphics2D actor. The Maude actor is a Maude process encapsulated in
a wrapper that enables interaction with other actors.
Communication between actors is performed via asynchronous message
passing through the IOP registry, which acts as a post oﬃce, routing the
messages from each sender actor to the desired target actor. There exist several
forms of communication: (i) inter-actor, i.e., from one actor to another; (ii)
meta-actor, i.e., from an actor to the registry; and (iii) interface, i.e., between
the GUI.editor and an actor (the registry or any other actor).
8 This should not be confused with the Maude-NPA GUI, since they are not the same.
S. Santiago et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 258 (2009) 3–20 11
3.2 Interactive Maude (IMaude)
Interactive Maude (IMaude) is a collection of Maude modules that support
writing interactive Maude applications where rewriting is interleaved with
communications with the environment and the IMaude application’s state
persists across communications.
An IMaude state has the form
[ input, st( control, wait4s, requests, environment, log),
output ]
where the notation “[input,state,output]” is standard for user interfaces
in Maude (see LOOP-MODE in [8]) and each IMaude component is described as
follows:
• control: it contains either the request currently being processed or the con-
stant ready if there is none.
• wait4s: a set of the suspended tasks waiting to handle incoming messages.
• requests: a queue of requests waiting to be processed by IMaude.
• environment: contains a set of entries mapping identiﬁers to data values.
• component: a list of log items for debugging by allowing events and status
to be recorded as requests are being processed.
IMaude provides rules for receiving, queueing, and scheduling requests
(generated by incoming IOP messages, or by internal rewrites), deﬁning con-
tinuations to receive replies to outgoing IOP messages. It provides mechanisms
to ensure sequential processing when needed, and enabling reactive response.
Built-in requests include saving and restoring the state, and access to the ﬁle
system.
3.3 The g2d package and the Graphics2d actor
The graphical interaction package g2d is a Java package designed to simplify
developing interactive visualizations for formal models and reasoning systems.
It consists of two main components—the JLambda programming language and
interpreter and the Glyphish hierarchy—together with additional classes for
organizing window elements.
JLambda is an untyped Scheme-like lexically scoped interpreted language,
that provides a runtime interface to available Java classes, using Java’s built-
in reﬂective capabilities. Since it is interpreted, JLambda expressions can be
evaluated at runtime.
The Glyphish hierarchy is a Java class hierarchy that provides abstractions
for creating interactive graphical objects, including specifying their shape,
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color, location, and behavior (reaction to events). Groups of glyphish objects
can be encapsulated as a single glyphish object. The g2d package also provides
classes for deﬁning and displaying graphs whose nodes and edges are glyphish
objects.
4 The Maude-NPA GUI in IOP-IMaude
The graphical interface for Maude-NPA that we have developed using IOP-
IMaude is publicly available 9 , including an installation and user manual and
some protocol examples.
There are two key aspects to developing an interactive graphical assistant
using IOP-IMaude. Namely, what objects of the model (Maude-NPA in our
case) to represent (and how), and what requests to the model can be made
via these objects. Once those two aspects are decided, there are two parts
to implement: extending IMaude to handle those input requests and produce
the result to such input requests as descriptions of graphical objects to be pre-
sented to the user. Usually, the input requests are sent as IOP messages from
the graphics2d actor to the Maude actor (as the result of a Java event in the
graphical interface such as clicking a button) and the output to each request
is sent as an IOP message from the Maude actor back to the graphics2d actor.
Note that the descriptions of graphical objects generated as the output to a
request are JLambda functions that realize the descriptions produced by the
IMaude NPA Assistant, including other necessary actions such as organizing
window elements, menus and toolbars. There is substantial ﬂexibility as to
how much detail is ﬁlled in by IMaude and how much is done in JLambda;
or, in other words, how much of the interface is dynamically generated by
IMaude and how much of it is statically created at the design stage. Figure 1
summarizes the Maude-NPA GUI infrastructure.
Let us now explain in detail one concrete sequence of actions and events,
namely generating more levels of the Maude-NPA backwards search space. As
explained in Section 5 below, this action is activated by clicking the “Next”
button. First, at design stage, we created a JLambda function nextClosure as
the event listener of the “Next” button. When clicked, this JLambda function
retrieves the number of levels to be generated and sequentially calls another
JLambda function nextClosureRec as many times as levels to generate. This
function is ultimately responsible for sending the request to IMaude:
(sinvoke "g2d.util.ActorMsg"
"send" "maude" gname (concat "nextLevel " (int 1)))
9 At http://www.dsic.upv.es/grupos/elp/Maude-NPA_GUI
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Fig. 1. Overview of the Maude-NPA GUI.
that calls the method send of the Glyphish class ActorMsg in order to make
the graphics2d actor send an IOP message to the Maude actor (denoted by
the string maude) on behalf of the search tree graph object (denoted by the
variable gname) such that the contents of the IOP message is a string of the
form “nextLevel 1”.
On the IMaude side, the received IOP message is added to the request
queue and is processed using the following (partially described) Maude rewrite
rule:
crl[nextLevel]:
[nil,st(processing(req(’nextLevel,...)),wait4s,reqQ,es,log),outQ]
=>
[nil,st(ready,wait4s,(reqQ reqQ1),es’,log),outQ]
if es’ := nextLevel(...)
/\ reqQ1 := req(’extendTree,...,
req(’redisplayNPATree,...,reqQ0)) .
where the Maude operator nextLevel is ultimately responsible for calling
Maude-NPA and generating a new environment es’ that contains the next
level of the search space as a string to be transmitted. In this rewrite rule, two
more requests reqQ1 are added to the IMaude request queue reqQevel, namely
extendTree and redisplayNPATree. These two requests will be processed by
IMaude rewrite rules as follows. The rule for extendTree: (i) extends the
IMaude local copy of the search tree, (ii) sends a request extendNPATree con-
taining the string stored in es’ to the graphics2d actor, and (iii) waits for
the graphics2d actor to acknowledge. In response, the graphics2d actor, ap-
plies the deﬁned JLambda function extendNPATree that processes the string,
extracting a description of the new tree nodes, adding the information to
the search tree graph, and sending an acknowledgement to IMaude. When
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IMaude receives the acknowledgement, the request redisplayNPATree is pro-
cessed and a redisplayNPATreeExp request is sent to the graphics2d actor,
which forces it to redisplay the graphic representation of the search space.
The user then sees the extended search tree.
5 A Sample Session with the Interface
The current version of the GUI developed for Maude-NPA allows the user
to analyze a crypto protocol speciﬁcation by displaying the search space tree
obtained by Maude-NPA. Apart from displaying the search space as a tree,
the user can obtain the textual information of each state in the tree and, as a
new special feature, can obtain a pictorial representation of the state strands.
Let us consider the famous Needham-Schroeder public key protocol (NSPK)
for demonstrating the tool. We recall the informal speciﬁcation of NSPK, as
follows:
A → B : pk(B,NA;A)
B → A : pk(A,NA;NB)
A → B : pk(B,NB)
where NA and NB are nonces generated by the respective principals. The
description of the NSPK protocol using strands is as follows:
:: r :: [ pke(B, n(A, r);A)+, pke(A, n(A, r);NB)
−, pke(B,NB)+ ]
:: r′ :: [ pke(B,NA;A)−, pke(A,NA;n(B, r′))+, pke(B, n(B, r′))− ]
The ﬁrst step is to select the protocol to be analyzed. The user can either
load his/her own protocol speciﬁcation ﬁle or select one of the provided ex-
amples. As explained in Section 2, Maude-NPA must generate the grammars
associated to the attack state. The user can provide a grammar ﬁle if he/she
has analyzed the same protocol speciﬁcation before, avoiding its generation.
Otherwise, Maude-NPA will generate it, thus increasing the load time. More
than one attack state can be deﬁned in the protocol speciﬁcation and the
user must select one. After the protocol, the attack state, and (possibly) the
grammars have been selected, a new window with the initialized search space
tree appears. This initial tree contains a node called “root node”, which is
the default parent node, and, then, the ﬁrst level of the search space tree.
One or more levels can be added to the tree by telling Maude-NPA, through
the GUI, to do so. There exists a button called “Next” (see Figure 2) which
generates a number of levels of the backwards search space. Each node of
the tree represents a state of the backwards search. Its background color is
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lavender if it is a regular node and green if it is an initial state, i.e., a solution
node. If a state has no children (predecessor states), its corresponding node at
the search space tree is given a white color. Figure 2 shows the search space
tree for the NSPK protocol when a solution node is found.
Fig. 2. Search space tree for the NSPK protocol.
As explained in Section 2, for each state, Maude-NPA gives: (i) the current
strands, (ii) the intruder knowledge, (iii) the sequence of messages, and (iv)
some additional data. There is a contextual menu associated to each node
of the search tree which allows the user to, either consult the textual state
information given by Maude-NPA, or to obtain a graphical representation of
the strands and intruder knowledge information given by Maude-NPA. For the
graphical display of strands we followed the original graphical representation
of strands shapes [27], but modiﬁed to represent the Maude-NPA notion of
time. Figure 3 shows the graphical representation of a Maude-NPA state.
A strand is drawn as a vertical sequence of dots connected between them
by a double vertical line. Each dot corresponds to an input or output message
in the strand and is also called a node. As explained in Section 2, both intruder
and honest principals behaviors are represented with strands and, thus, shown
in the graphical representation. To diﬀerentiate between an intruder and an
honest strand, we use grey and black for honest strands and light and dark
green for intruder strands. The aim of having two colors for each type of strand
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Fig. 3. Strands representation.
is to represent the notion of time: lighter colors for the past and present, and
darker colors for the future. The vertical bar used in Maude-NPA for denoting
the time position is here represented by a slanted line.
The intruder knowledge (t ∈ I and t ∈ I) is integrated into the graphical
representation by using diﬀerent colors for the messages attached to each node.
We use red if the message is known by the intruder (t ∈ I) and black if the
message is not known (t ∈ I). For messages that do not yet belong to a
concrete strand, we use a single dot instead of a vertical sequence of dots.
We would like to conclude this section showing how the initial state associ-
ated to the NSPK protocol is represented by both its textual and its graphical
representations in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
Fig. 4. Textual information of the initial state found for the NSPK protocol.
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Fig. 5. Graphical display of the initial state found for the NSPK protocol.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a graphical user interface for the Maude-NPA protocol
analysis tool. Maude-NPA is both a framework for modular reasoning about
protocols with diﬀerent equational theories and an implementation of that
framework in Maude, incorporating several of those theories. The Maude-NPA
GUI allows the user to visualize the output of Maude-NPA at diﬀerent levels
of detail and to incrementally probe the search space. The strands appearing
in the search space can be displayed either as terms or by using a graphical
representation that shows the ordering between diﬀerent protocol messages in
a natural way. These features make the analysis of the results produced by
Maude-NPA easier to understand and simplify the task of analyzing a crypto
protocol.
Future work on the GUI includes improving the graphical visualization of
Maude-NPA strands and extending the GUI to allow the user to specify crypto
protocols using graphical input, with helpful syntactic checks. A long-term
goal is to automate extracting and visualizing information from Maude-NPA
analyses in a way that will not only tell the user that his/her protocol is
incorrect, but also where the security bug is located and how it could be
repaired.
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